Single Idea 15337

[catalogued under 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique]

Full Idea

The principle difficulty of the correspondence theory of truth is its vagueness. It is too vague to be called a theory until more information is given about what is meant by the terms 'correspondence' and 'fact'. Facts can involve a heavy ontology.

Gist of Idea

The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts'

Source

Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1)

Book Reference

Horsten,Leon: 'The Tarskian Turn' [MIT 2011], p.13


A Reaction

I see nothing here to make me give up my commitment to the correspondence view of truth, though it sounds as if I will have to give up the word 'theory' in that context. Truth is so obviously about thought fitting reality that there is nothing to discuss.

Related Idea

Idea 15338 We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten]