Single Idea 15338

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact]

Full Idea

While positive and perhaps even negative atomic facts may be unproblematic, it seems excessive to commit oneself to the existence of logically complex facts such as disjunctive facts.

Gist of Idea

We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones?

Source

Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1)

Book Reference

Horsten,Leon: 'The Tarskian Turn' [MIT 2011], p.13


A Reaction

Presumably it is hard to deny that very complex statements involving massive disjunctions can be true or false. But why does commitment to real facts have to involve a huge ontology? The ontology is just the ingredients of the fact, isn't it?

Related Idea

Idea 15337 The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten]