Single Idea 15435

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties]

Full Idea

Any theorist of universals as immanent had better hold a sparse theory; it is preposterous on its face that a thing has as many nonspatiotemporal parts as there are different predicates that it falls under, or different classes that it belongs to.


'Sparse' is opposed to 'abundant' about properties

Gist of Idea

If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate


David Lewis (Against Structural Universals [1986], 'Why believe')

Book Reference

Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.82

A Reaction

I am firmly committed to sparse universal, and view the idea that properties are just predicates as the sort of nonsense that results from approaching philosophy too linguistically.