Single Idea 15452

[catalogued under 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object]

Full Idea

We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.

Gist of Idea

We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures


David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)

Book Reference

Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.109

A Reaction

This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.