Full Idea
To say that properties are really relations to times is to treat temporary intrinsics (such as my changing shape) as a matter of relations, but then 'intrinsic properties' would not deserve the name, and it is untenable if it denies temporary intrinsics.
Gist of Idea
You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times)
Source
David Lewis (Rearrangement of Particles [1988], 1)
Book Reference
Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.188
A Reaction
[I have compressed a paragraph; he refers to his 1986:204] If a property is meant to be a 'relation to a time', I am not sure what the relata are meant to be, and I agree with Lewis that this seems a long way from properties.