Single Idea 15546

[catalogued under 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths]

Full Idea

Predications seem, for the most part, to be true not because of whether things are, but because of how things are.

Gist of Idea

Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists


David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'The demand')

Book Reference

Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.204

A Reaction

This simple point shows that you get into a tangle if you insist that truthmakers just consist of what exists. Lewis says Armstrong offers states of affairs as truthmakers for predications.

Related Idea

Idea 10915 The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]