Single Idea 15548

[catalogued under 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths]

Full Idea

I want to say that 'truth is supervenient on being', but as an Ostrich about universals I want to construe 'being' broadly.


An 'Ostrich' refuses to admit the problem of universals

Gist of Idea

Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly


David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'Truth')

Book Reference

Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.206

A Reaction

[His slogan is borrowed from Bigelow 1988:132-,158-9] This seems much more promising that the more precise and restricted notion of truthmakers, as resting on the existence of particular things. Presentism is the big test case.