Single Idea 15736

[catalogued under 19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds]

Full Idea

I identify propositions with properties that are instantiated only by entire possible worlds. If properties are the sets of their instances, a proposition is a set of possible worlds. A proposition is the property of being a world where it holds.

Gist of Idea

A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true


David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5)

Book Reference

Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.53

A Reaction

This is so far away from my concept of a proposition (as a truth-evaluable representational mental event) that I struggle to compute it. So the proposition that I am sitting here is the property of 'being the actual world'. Eh?

Related Idea

Idea 15738 Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis]