Single Idea 16160

[catalogued under 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity]

Full Idea

It just is not the case that individuals are the individuals they are by virtue of some intrinsic essential distinguishing mark.

Gist of Idea

For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark

Source

report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], id) by Michael Frede - Substance in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' p.78

Book Reference

Frede,Michael: 'Essays in Ancient Philosophy' [University of Minnesota 1987], p.78


A Reaction

That invites the question what does distinguish qualitatively identical things from one another. I'm not sure if Aristotle even bothers about that question.