Single Idea 16261

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems]

Full Idea

If Quine restricts himself to first-order predicate calculus, then the ontological implications concern the subjects of predicates. The nature of predicates, and what must be true for the predication, have disappeared from the radar screen.

Gist of Idea

If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication

Source

comment on Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 3.1

Book Reference

Maudlin,Tim: 'The Metaphysics within Physics' [OUP 2007], p.83


A Reaction

Quine's response, I presume, is that the predicates can all be covered extensionally (red is a list of the red objects), and so a simpler logic will do the whole job. I agree with Maudlin though.

Related Idea

Idea 16260 Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin]