Single Idea 16262

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties]

Full Idea

Lewis surveys three accounts of sparse properties: a set of objects instantiating a single universal; a set of objects having as parts duplicates of some trope; and a set distinguished by a further unanalyzable, primitive characteristic of naturalness.

Gist of Idea

Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness


report of David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], p.60-) by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics

Book Reference

Maudlin,Tim: 'The Metaphysics within Physics' [OUP 2007], p.85

A Reaction

The very idea of suggesting that a property is some set of objects strikes me as bizarre. I present you with a table full of objects and say that is the complete set of some property. You then have to study the objects to find out what the property is.

Related Idea

Idea 16263 Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin]