Single Idea 16520

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences]

Full Idea

We can significantly ask what properties it is necessary for something to possess in order to be a thing of such and such a kind, since that asks what properties enter into the definition of the kind. But there is no such definition of the individual.

Gist of Idea

We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual

Source

A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], 9.A.5)

Book Reference

Ayer,A.J.: 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' [Penguin 1976], p.197


A Reaction

[Quoted, not surprisingly, by Wiggins] Illuminating. If essence is just about necessary properties, I begin to see why the sortal might be favoured. I take it to concern explanatory mechanisms, and hence the individual.