Single Idea 16538

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds]

Full Idea

If we explicate the notion of metaphysical necessity in terms of the notion of essence, rather than vice versa, this may enable us to dispense with the language of possible worlds as a means of explicating modal statements.

Gist of Idea

We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences


E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)

Book Reference

-: 'Mind' [-], p.16

A Reaction

This is the approach I favour, though I am not convinced that the two approaches are in competition, since essentialism gives the driving force for necessity, whereas possible worlds map the logic and semantics of it.