Single Idea 16550

[catalogued under 19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference]

Full Idea

It may be objected that currently prevailing causal or 'direct' theories of reference precisely deny that a thinker must know what it is the he or she is thinking about in order to be able to think about it.

Gist of Idea

Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about

Source

E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 7)

Book Reference

-: 'Mind' [-], p.26


A Reaction

Lowe says that at least sometimes we have to know that we are thinking about, so this account of reference can't be universally true. My solution is to pull identity and essence apart. You only need identity, not essence, for reference.