Single Idea 16636

[catalogued under 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique]

Full Idea

To me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And to say a die is hard, extended and square is not to attribute those qualities to a distinct subject, but only an explication of the word 'die'.

Gist of Idea

A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents


George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], n 49)

Book Reference

'A Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest [Blackwell 1995], p.65

A Reaction

This is apparently a reaction to Locke, and a final rejection of the medieval idea of a 'substance'. Unfortunately it leaves Berkeley with a 'bundle' view of objects (a typical empiricist account), which is even worse.