Single Idea 16891

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic]

Full Idea

Gödel undermined Frege's assumption that all but the basic truths are provable in a system, but insofar as one conceives of proof informally as an epistemic ordering among truths, one can see his vision as worth developing.

Gist of Idea

Despite Gödel, Frege's epistemic ordering of all the truths is still plausible

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 1

Book Reference

Burge,Tyler: 'Truth, Thought, Reason (on Frege)' [OUP 2001], p.361


A Reaction

[compressed] This 'epistemic ordering' fits my thesis of seeing the world through our explanations of it.