Single Idea 18074

[catalogued under 4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic]

Full Idea

Though it may appear that the intuitionist is providing an account of the connectives couched in terms of assertability conditions, the notion of assertability is a derivative one, ultimately cashed out by appealing to the concept of truth.

Gist of Idea

Intuitionists rely on assertability instead of truth, but assertability relies on truth

Source

Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 06.5)

Book Reference

Kitcher,Philip: 'The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge' [OUP 1984], p.143


A Reaction

I have quite a strong conviction that Kitcher is right. All attempts to eliminate truth, as some sort of ideal at the heart of ordinary talk and of reasoning, seems to me to be doomed.

Related Idea

Idea 18073 Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher]