Single Idea 18418

[catalogued under 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions]

Full Idea

Lewis's theory of a perspectival 'de se' content ...delivers truth conditions not absolutely, but only relative to a choice of agent/center.


'De se' is self-referring, or indexical

Gist of Idea

A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent


report of David Lewis (Attitudes De Dicto and De Se [1979]) by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 05.7

Book Reference

Cappelen,H/Dever,J: 'The Inessential Indexical' [OUP 2013], p.108

A Reaction

The proposal rests on a theory of 'centred' possible worlds, specifying the viewpoint of some agent within the whole system. It relies on accepting the idea that indexicals are special, which Cappelen and Dever reject.