Single Idea 18487

[catalogued under 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers]

Full Idea

The generalisation 'What makes a (any) sentence true?' is not a request for definitions of 'true' (the concept), but rather requests for (partial) explanations of why certain particular sentences are true.

Gist of Idea

We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true'


Ian McFetridge (Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge [1977], II)

Book Reference

McFetridge,Ian G.: 'Logical Necessity' [Aristotelian Soc 1990], p.38

A Reaction

McFetridge is responding to the shortcomings of Tarski's account of truth. The mystery seems to be why some of our representations of the world are 'successful', and others are not.