Single Idea 18668

[catalogued under 22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity]

Full Idea

My guiding assumption is that truths about value, at least, regularly entail normative truths of some sort about actions or attitudes.

Gist of Idea

Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes

Source

Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 1.4)

Book Reference

Orsi,Francesco: 'Value Theory' [Bloomsbury 2015], p.9


A Reaction

Not quite as clear as it sounds. If I say 'the leaf is green' I presume a belief that it is green, which is an attitude. If I say 'shut the door' that implies an action with no value. One view says that values are entirely normative in this way.