Full Idea
According to the Non-Standard conception of Metaphysical Necessity, P is metaphysically necessary when its negation is logically incompatible with the nature of things.
Gist of Idea
Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things
Source
Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 10)
Book Reference
'Identity and Modality', ed/tr. MacBride,Fraser [OUP 2006], p.39
A Reaction
Rosen's new second meaning of the term. My immediate problem is with it resting on being 'logically' incompatible. Are squares 'logically' incompatible with circles? I like the idea that it rests on 'the nature of things'. (Psst! natures = essences)
Related Ideas
Idea 18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
Idea 18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]