Single Idea 18951

[catalogued under 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition]

Full Idea

For a language L there is a predicate 'true-in-L' which one can employ for all scientific purposes in place of intuitive truth, and this predicate admits of a precise definition using only the vocabulary of L itself plus set theory.

Gist of Idea

For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory

Source

Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.2)

Book Reference

Putnam,Hilary: 'Philosophy of Logic' [Routledge 1972], p.21


A Reaction

He refers, of course, to Tarski's theory. I'm unclear of the division between 'scientific purposes' and the rest of life (which is why some people embrace 'minimal' theories of ordinary truth). I'm struck by set theory being a necessary feature.

Related Idea

Idea 10353 Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch]