Single Idea 19007

[catalogued under 14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science]

Full Idea

A physical theory need not be true to be good, Field has argued, and I agree. All we ask of it truth-wise is that its physical implications should be true, or, in my version, that it should be true about the physical.

Gist of Idea

A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects

Source

Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 12.5)

Book Reference

Yablo,Stephen: 'Aboutness' [Princeton 2014], p.204


A Reaction

Yablo is, of course, writing a book here about the concept of 'about'. This seems persuasive. The internal terminology of the theory isn't committed to anything - it is only at its physical periphery (Quine) that the ontology matters.