Single Idea 19039

[catalogued under 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals]

Full Idea

The Armstrong/Tooley/Dretske view, which takes laws to be substantial but grounded in a relation of nomic necessitation external to the properties themselves, is not an attractive option for the dispositionalist.

Gist of Idea

The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism


Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.8)

Book Reference

Vetter,Barbara: 'Potentiality: from Dispositions to Modality' [OUP 2015], p.288

A Reaction

The point is that the dispositionalist sees laws as grounded in the properties. I prefer her other option, of dispositionalism plus a 'shallow' view of laws (which she attributes to Mumford). The laws are as Lewis says, but powers explain them.