Single Idea 19121

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties]

Full Idea

One might say that 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher. We quantify over formulas instead of over definable properties, and thus reduce properties to truth.

Gist of Idea

We can reduce properties to true formulas


Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.1)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.2

A Reaction

[compressed] This stuff is difficult (because the axioms are complex and hard to compare), but I am excited (yes!) about this idea. Their point is that you need a truth predicate within the object language for this, which disquotational truth forbids.

Related Idea

Idea 19122 Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]