Single Idea 19122

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta]

Full Idea

The reduction of second-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth is a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (e.g. comprehension axioms) by innocuous assumptions about the truth predicate.

Gist of Idea

Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories


Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.1)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.2

A Reaction

I'm currently thinking that axiomatic theories of truth are the most exciting development in contemporary philosophy. See Halbach and Horsten.

Related Idea

Idea 19121 We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]