Single Idea 19568

[catalogued under 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth]

Full Idea

There are cognitive successes that are not obviously truth related, such as the concepts of making sense of the course of experience, and having found an empirically adequate theory.

Gist of Idea

Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes


Jonathan Kvanvig (Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal [2005], 'Epistemic')

Book Reference

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.361

A Reaction

He is claiming that truth is not the main aim of epistemology. He quotes Marian David for the rival view. Personally I doubt whether the concepts of 'making sense' or 'empirical adequacy' can be explicated without mentioning truth.