Single Idea 19570

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism]

Full Idea

The most serious problem for reliabilism is that it cannot explain adequately the concept of propositional justification, the kind of justification one might have for a proposition one does not believe, or which one disbelieves.

Gist of Idea

Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe


Jonathan Kvanvig (Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal [2005], Notes 2)

Book Reference

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.362

A Reaction

I don't understand this (though I pass it on anyway). Why can't the reliabilist just offer a critique of the reliability of the justification available for the dubious proposition?