Single Idea 19703

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues]

Full Idea

It is widely believed that epistemic justification is distinct from other species of justification such as moral or pragmatic justification in that it is intended to serve the so-called 'truth-goal'.

Gist of Idea

Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal


Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 1)

Book Reference

'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.145

A Reaction

Kvanvig explicitly argues against this view. He broadens the aims, but it strikes me that other aims are all intertwined with truth in some way, so I find this idea quite plausible.

Related Idea

Idea 19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]