Single Idea 19731

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues]

Full Idea

Conceiving of the virtues in terms of faculties or powers doesn't help at all with the problem of accounting for propositional knowledge.

Gist of Idea

If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge


Jonathan Kvanvig (Virtue Epistemology [2011], IV B)

Book Reference

'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.204

A Reaction

It always looks as if epistemic virtues are a little peripheral to the main business of knowledge, which is getting beliefs to be correct and well-founded. Given that epistemic saints make occasional mistakes, talk of virtues can't be enough.