Single Idea 19732

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues]

Full Idea

The Swamping Problem is that the value of truth swamps the value of additional features of true beliefs which are only instrumentally related to them. True belief is no more valuable if one adds a feature valuable for getting one to the truth.

Gist of Idea

The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself


Jonathan Kvanvig (Virtue Epistemology [2011], IV B)

Book Reference

'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.206

A Reaction

His targets here are reliabilism and epistemic virtues. Kvanvig's implication is that the key to understanding the nature of knowledge is to pinpoint why we value it so much.