Single Idea 20024

[catalogued under 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions]

Full Idea

Later Davidson dropped his reductive treatment of intentions (in terms of 'pro-attitudes' and other beliefs), and accepted that intentions are irreducible, and distinct from pro-attitudes.

Gist of Idea

Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive


report of Donald Davidson (Intending [1978]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 2

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.8

A Reaction

Only a philosopher would say that intentions cannot be reduced to something else. Since I have a very physicalist view of the mind, I incline to reduce them to powers and dispositions of physical matter.