Single Idea 20921

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique]

Full Idea

How could what is bitter for us be sweet and sour for others, if there is not some determinate nature for them?

Gist of Idea

How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature?

Source

Theophrastus (On the Senses [c.321 BCE], 70)

Book Reference

Democritus: 'Early Greek Phil VII: Democritus', ed/tr. Laks,A/Most,G [Harvard Loeb 2016], p.415


A Reaction

The remark is aimed at Democritus. This is part of the general question of how you can even talk about relativism, without attaching stable meanings to the concepts employed.