Single Idea 21327

[catalogued under 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity]

Full Idea

When a stolen horse is claimed, the only evidence that this is the same horse is similitude. But would it not be ridiculous from this to infer that the identity of a horse consists in similitude only?

Gist of Idea

If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude

Source

Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 6)

Book Reference

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Perry,John [University of California 1975], p.116


A Reaction

Actually that is exactly Hume's view of the matter (Idea 21292). For a strict empiricist there is nothing else be close resemblance over time. I prefer Reid's account to Hume's. - but then I am not a 'strict' empiricist.

Related Idea

Idea 21326 Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke]