Single Idea 21456

[catalogued under 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism]

Full Idea

Being subject to the condition of experienceability - that is, necessarily related in some manner to intuition - is not the same as being composed of experiences in any sense (and particularly Berkeley's sense).

Gist of Idea

Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism

Source

comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Sebastian Gardner - Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason 08 'Non-phenom'

Book Reference

Gardner,Sebastian: 'Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason' [Routledge 1999], p.274


A Reaction

This is Gardner's best explanation of why Kant is definitely not a Berkeleyan idealist (who claims objects ARE conscious experiences)