Single Idea 21614

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic]

Full Idea

The 'nihilist' view is that no genuine distinction can be vaguely drawn; since vague expressions are not properly meaningful, there is nothing for sorites reasoning to betray; they are empty.

Gist of Idea

The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept

Source

Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 6.1)

Book Reference

Williamson,Timothy: 'Vagueness' [Routledge 1996], p.165


A Reaction

He cites Frege as holding this view. The thought is that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept, so fussing over what qualifies as one is pointless. This seems to be a semantic view of vagueness, of which the main rival is the contextual view.

Related Idea

Idea 21618 If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson]