Single Idea 21711

[catalogued under 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement]

Full Idea

The basic idea of Russell's new 'multiple relations' theory of belief was that belief does not relate an individual to a proposition composed of various individuals and universals, but rather relates the believer directly to those constituents.

Gist of Idea

Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions

Source

report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 3.1

Book Reference

Linsky,Bernard: 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic' [CSLI 1999], p.45


A Reaction

Russell abandoned his commitment to propositions in 1908, and retained this new view until 1918. Wittgenstein gave Russell hell over this theory. This view made his 'congruence' account of the correspondence theory of truth possible.

Related Idea

Idea 5426 Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell]