Single Idea 21834

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind]

Full Idea

There is still some hope for something like identity theory for sensations. But almost no one believes that strict identity theory will work for more complex mental states. Strict identity is stronger than type neurophysicalism.

Gist of Idea

Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be

Source

Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology')

Book Reference

Flanagan,Owen: 'The Really Hard Problem' [MIT 2007], p.94


A Reaction

It is so hard to express the problem. What needs to be explained? How can one bunch of neurons represent many different things? It's not like computing. That just transfers the data to brains, where the puzzling stuff happens.