Single Idea 22468

[catalogued under 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue]

Full Idea

Some virtues do give us aims, but nothing from within morality suggests the kind of good state of affairs which it would seem always to be our duty to promote. And why indeed should there be any such thing?

Gist of Idea

Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them

Source

Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)

Book Reference

Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.101


A Reaction

Isn't successful human functioning, such as heath, always to be desired? If honour is a worthy aim, doesn't that make being rightly honoured a desirable state of affairs? She is attacking consequentialism, but I'm not convinced here.