Single Idea 2424

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism]

Full Idea

It would be odd for a fundamental property like experience to be instantiated for the first time only relatively late in the history of the universe, and even then only in occasional complex systems.

Gist of Idea

It is odd if experience is a very recent development

Source

David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 3.8.4)

Book Reference

Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.297


A Reaction

The assumption of this remark is that experience is 'fundamental', which seems to claim that it is a separate ontological category. Maybe, but experience doesn't seem to be a thing. 'Process' seems a better term, and that is not a novelty in the universe.