Single Idea 2550

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind]

Full Idea

We can't define the mental as intentional because pains aren't about anything, and we can't define it as phenomenal because beliefs don't feel like anything.


'Intentional' events are about things; 'phenomenal' events feel like something

Gist of Idea

Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia


Richard Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1980], 1.2)

Book Reference

Rorty,Richard: 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' [Blackwell 1980], p.22

A Reaction

Nice, but simplistic? There is usually an intentional object for a pain, and the concepts which we use to build beliefs contain the residue of remembered qualia. It seems unlikely that any mind could have one without the other (even a computer).