Single Idea 2683

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism]

Full Idea

In 'De Anima' Aristotle cannot fit his account of separable reason - which is not the form of a body - into his general theory that the soul is the form of the body.

Gist of Idea

Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body

Source

comment on Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by J.L. Ackrill - Aristotle on Eudaimonia p.33

Book Reference

'Essays on Aristotle's Ethics', ed/tr. Rorty,Amélie Oksenberg [University of California 1980], p.33


A Reaction

A penetrating observation. Possibly the biggest challenge for a modern physicalist is to give a reductive account of 'pure' reason, in terms of brain events or brain functions.