Single Idea 3245

[catalogued under 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self]

Full Idea

The identity of the self must have some sort of objectivity, otherwise the subjective question whether a future experience will be mine or not will be contentless.

Gist of Idea

The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity

Source

Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], III.3)

Book Reference

Nagel,Thomas: 'The View from Nowhere' [OUP 1989], p.37


A Reaction

This sounds a bit circular and question-begging. If there is no objective self, then the question of whether a future experience will be mine would be a misconceived question. I sympathise with Nagel's attempt to show how personal identity is a priori.