Single Idea 3328

[catalogued under 4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets]

Full Idea

Contrary to Dedekind's anti-realism, Frege proposed a realist definition of a set as the extension of a predicate (or concept, or function).

Clarification

The 'extension' of the set is the actual things which the set contains (e.g. trees); hence he must accept real trees

Gist of Idea

Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.13

Book Reference

Benardete,José A.: 'Metaphysics: The Logical Approach' [OUP 1989], p.91