Single Idea 3376

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism]

Full Idea

In order to make sense of the empirical character of mind-brain identity, we must acknowledge the existence of phenomenal properties.

Clarification

'Phenomenal properties' are raw experiences, like colour

Gist of Idea

We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties

Source

Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 66)

Book Reference

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.66


A Reaction

Mind-brain identity is, of course, an ontological theory, not an epistemological one (like empiricism). I suspect that the basis for my belief in reductive physicalism is an intuition, which I am hoping is a rational intuition. Cf. Idea 3989.

Related Idea

Idea 3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]