Single Idea 3414

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies]

Full Idea

Is there anything about the qualitative characters of mental states which, should we come to know it, would convince us that zombies and qualia inversion are not really possible?

Gist of Idea

What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible?

Source

Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.171)

Book Reference

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.171


A Reaction

The issue is what causes the qualitative states, not their 'characters'. This strikes me as falling into the trap of thinking that 'what it is like to be..' is a crucial issue. I think zombies are impossible, but not because I experience redness.