Single Idea 3463

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds]

Full Idea

Except when doing philosophy there is no "problem" of other minds, because we do not hold a "hypothesis" or "belief" or "supposition" that other people are conscious.

Gist of Idea

We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds


John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 3.IV)

Book Reference

Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.77

A Reaction

Our commitment to other minds is so deep-ingrained that it is a candidate for one of Hume's 'natural beliefs', or even (a step further) for an innate idea. Babies have an innate recognition of faces, so why can't an expectation of a mind be hard-wired?