Single Idea 3497

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability]

Full Idea

The same principle that implies multiple realisability would seem to imply universal realisability. …Any object whatever could have syntactical ascriptions made to it.

Gist of Idea

If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it

Source

John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 9.V)

Book Reference

Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.207


A Reaction

This leads to rather weak reductio objections to functionalism. Logically there may be no restriction on how to implement a mind, but naturally there are very tight restrictions. Stick to neurons seems the best strategy.