Single Idea 3499

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique]

Full Idea

Most of the works I have seen in the computational theory of the mind commit some variation on the homunculus fallacy.


The homunculus fallacy says a person's mind contains a little person

Gist of Idea

Computation presupposes consciousness


John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 9.VI)

Book Reference

Searle,John R.: 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' [MIT 1999], p.212

A Reaction

This will be because there is an unspoken user for the inner computer. But see Fodor's view (Idea 2506). The key idea here is Dennett's: that not all regresses are vicious. My mind controller isn't like all of me.

Related Idea

Idea 2506 If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor]