Single Idea 4233

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism]

Full Idea

If sets are particulars, a nominalist may say that 'blueness' is a set of particulars, but which set? If the particulars 'are blue' this threatens circularity - though resemblance is usually appealed to to avoid this.

Gist of Idea

If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set

Source

E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.355)

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'A Survey of Metaphysics' [OUP 2002], p.355


A Reaction

This supports my suspicion that nominalism is superficially attractive and 'scientific', but when you dig deep into it the theory won't get off the ground without universals.